In this paper I explore, in sections 2 and 3, respectively, Herman Dooyeweerd’s notion of naive experience and the notion of common sense as found in the writings of Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore. I argue in section 4 that naive experience and common sense are assigned a structurally similar functional role by their advocates—viz., the role of touchstone for philosophy. In the final section I stage a conversation between Dooyeweerd and Reid about the touchstones they adopt.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Reid on MemoryRené van Woudenbergthis paper is a discussion of Thomas Reid’s views on memory as an “avenue of knowledge.” Part 1 deals with various remarks Reid makes concerning memory, knowledge, and belief which he holds to be “obvious and certain.” Part contains a more detailed discussion of Reid’s thesis that “memory is unaccountable.” Part 3 inquires how Reid’s critique of the Way of Ideas fits with his (...) own views on memory.Reid’s dealings with memory are part of his broader inquiries into the intellectual faculties of the human mind. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid discusses not only memory, but other avenues of knowledge as well, such as perception and reasoning. In these essays Reid is doing straight epistemology. This is not to deny that Reid addresses other topics as well. In the essay on memory, for instance, Reid criticizes John Locke’s account of personal identity. But even then his discussion focusses on epistemological matters; one of his conclusions, for example, is that Locke confounded personal identity with the evidence we have of our personal identity, a thesis, Reid points out, that is bristled with absurd consequences. Although, then, Reid’s views on memory are related with his views on personal identity, I will abstain from a discussion of the latter. His epistemology of memory, I think, warrants attention in its own right.11. memory, knowledge, and beliefI.IIn Essay III of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1784],2 entitled “Of Memory,” Reid writes: [End Page 117]It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as they exist in the present moment.(EIP 339)Memory, says Reid, gives us knowledge of things past, whereas sense perception gives us knowledge of things present. Reid takes it to be “obvious and certain” (as the title of the first chapter of Essay III indicates) that “The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception... must be something which is present. What now is, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that which is past and gone be an object of perception” (EIP 340).These remarks may, however, occasion some doubts. One way of explaining Reid’s remark that the object of memory is something that is past, is that whenever someone, S, remembers something, viz., that p, p will be a proposition about something that is past.3 This explanation gives the right result for such propositions as there was snowfall in late August, and she once visited Finland4 But, as Norman Malcolm has observed, it does not always give the right results.5 For, he says, there are cases of S remembering that p, where p is not a proposition about the past. Let p be his telephone number is 2 79-289-59 75, or his car is in the garage. What is remembered, in these cases, is a proposition about something that is not past, but present (or: about what is presently the case). It is, so it seems at least, possible for S to remember the present.It even seems possible for S “to remember the future” (something Aristotle deemed impossible).6 S can remember, for instance, that the game starts at 8:00 P.M., or that there will be elections next year.No doubt some will find these suggestions preposterous. Still, we say such things as “I remember my telephone number” and “I remember the game starts at 8:00 P.M.” Someone who balks at the suggestion that we can remember present and even future things, therefore, has to find a way of dealing with these quite common modes of saying. One way would be to argue that these manners of saying are incorrect, another that they are elliptical. Since the first thesis is unconvincing (it is, after all, correct, i.e., correct English to use the expressions under consideration), we are left with the second, viz., that these modes of saying are elliptical. Can this be made acceptable? Let us see.Might... (shrink)

Our lives are increasingly intertwined with the digital realm, and with new technology, new ethical problems emerge. The academic field that addresses these problems—which we tentatively call ‘digital ethics’—can be an important intellectual resource for policy making and regulation. This is why it is important to understand how the new ethical challenges of a digital society are being met by academic research. We have undertaken a scientometric analysis to arrive at a better understanding of the nature, scope and dynamics of (...) the field of digital ethics. Our approach in this paper shows how the field of digital ethics is distributed over various academic disciplines. By first having experts select a collection of keywords central to digital ethics, we have generated a dataset of articles discussing these issues. This approach allows us to generate a scientometric visualisation of the field of digital ethics, without being constrained by any preconceived definitions of academic disciplines. We have first of all found that the number of publications pertaining to digital ethics is exponentially increasing. We furthermore established that whereas one may expect digital ethics to be a species of ethics, we in fact found that the various questions pertaining to digital ethics are predominantly being discussed in computer science, law and biomedical science. It is in these fields, more than in the independent field of ethics, that ethical discourse is being developed around concrete and often technical issues. Moreover, it appears that some important ethical values are very prominent in one field (e.g., autonomy in medical science), while being almost absent in others. We conclude that to get a thorough understanding of, and grip on, all the hard ethical questions of a digital society, ethicists, policy makers and legal scholars will need to familiarize themselves with the concrete and practical work that is being done across a range of different scientific fields to deal with these questions. (shrink)

The recent development of RNA replicating protocells and capsules that enclose complex biosynthetic cascade reactions are encouraging signs that we are gradually getting better at mastering the complexity of biological systems. The road to truly cellular compartments is still very long, but concrete progress is being made. Compartmentalization is a crucial natural methodology to enable control over biological processes occurring within the living cell. In fact, compartmentalization has been considered by some theories to be instrumental in the creation of life. (...) With the advancement of chemical biology, artificial compartments that can mimic the cell as a whole, or that can be regarded as cell organelles, have recently received much attention. The membrane between the inner and outer environment of the compartment has to meet specific requirements, such as semi‐permeability, to allow communication and molecular transport over the border. The membrane can either be built from natural constituents or from synthetic polymers, introducing robustness to the capsule. (shrink)

We aim to contribute to recent situational approaches to the study of interpersonal violence by elaborating the concept of trajectories. Trajectories are communicative processes in which antagonists act upon each other’s bodily and verbal actions to project a direction for the interaction to take, which is then (con) tested in the exchanges that follow. We use the notion of trajectories to gain insight in how participants turn an antagonistic situation into a violent encounter, which we contrast to interactionist and micro-sociological (...) understandings. Using ethnomethodological and conversation analytical tools, we detail the trajectories of three violent encounters, captured on phone camera recordings to answer the question how verbal and bodily exchanges project physical violence. Methodologically, our contribution shows how bodily actions can be studied in visual data. Our cases show how antagonists move the interaction toward violence by creating a metaconflict revolving around the conditions under which the interaction will become a physical confrontation; what we call the contested projection of violence. We conclude that the concept of trajectories offers a useful analytical tool to detail the shifts and turns of the interactive process—notably it’s bodily dimensions— that characterize antagonism and violence. Substantially, our analysis raises questions about conceptualizations of the emotional dynamics (notably the role of dominance) of violence, as proposed by earlier micro-sociological and interactionist work. We therefore suggest that future studies engage with these issues in more detail and in larger datasets. (shrink)

Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering’s argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument’s conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with (...) the premises. (shrink)

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a change in the perception of the arts and of philosophy. In the arts this transition occurred around 1800, with, for instance, the breakdown of Vitruvianism in architecture, while in philosophy the foundationalism of which Descartes and Spinoza were paradigmatic representatives, which presumed that philosophy and the sciences possessed a method of ensuring the demonstration of truths, was undermined by the idea, asserted by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, that there exist alternative styles of enquiry among (...) which a choice is open. The essays in this book examine the circumstances, features, and consequences of this historical transition, exploring in particular new aspects and instances of the inter-relatedness of content and its formal representation in both the arts and philosophy. (shrink)

Hoewel misschien minder dan vroeger, zijn velen van ons op zoek naar waarheid, of ‘de’ waarheid . We beseffen dat het ‘hebben’ van waarheid een groot goed is. We beseffen ook dat waarheid, of ‘de’ waarheid, soms of vaak, moeilijk te achterhalen is: het is een soms of vaak ongrijpbaar goed. Wie echter geen volslagen scepticus is kan in beginsel lijsten aanleggen van beweringen waarvan hij weet dat ze waar zijn, beweringen waarvan hij weet dat ze onwaar zijn, maar ook (...) van beweringen waarvan hij niet weet of ze waar dan wel onwaar zijn. (shrink)

This ground-breaking book opens up new vistas on the study of the humanities. Co-authored by three philosophers, it offers an in-depth exploration of a range of questions. For example, what, if anything, unifies scholarship in the humanities? Is it possible to attain objective truth in fields like history or literary studies or philosophy, or is everything a matter of perspective or standpoint? It is possible for fields in the humanities to make progress, and if so, how? And what should we (...) make of the political aims of the humanities-for example, the desire by many scholars in the humanities to uncover systems of oppression and domination? Does this interfere with "objective" scholarship or not? A host of new topics are also considered, such as whether or not replication studies are possible and worthwhile in the context of the humanities, and whether deference to other scholars is legitimate in the humanities. Finally, new "case studies" are introduced that look at how fields such as history, literary studies, and musicology advance our understanding of their topics, and a provocative set of new "rules" for interpretation in the humanities are proposed. (shrink)

This paper discusses some arguments against some traditional 'proofs of God's existence'. First it is argued that it is not obvious that these arguments are fallacious. Secondly, I try to articulate why so many Protestant thinkers maintained a hostile attitude toward the traditional proofs. I argue that their attitude was shaped by the conviction that belief in God is epistemically justified even when it is not based on argument or proof. I reconstruct Bavinck's treatment of the traditional proofs as a (...) rejection of what has come to be called 'classical foundationalism'. Lastly I try to show that even though Protestant thinkers were right in claiming that one does not need any of the traditional arguments in order to be epistemically justified in believing that God exists, this does not imply that such arguments are without any value. (shrink)

This paper argues that reading is a source of knowledge. Epistemologists have virtually ignored reading as a source of knowledge. This paper argues, first, that reading is not to be equated with attending to testimony, and second that it cannot be reduced to perception. Next an analysis of reading is offered and the source of knowledge that reading is further delineated. Finally it is argued that the source that reading is, can be both transmissive and generative, is non-basic, once was (...) a non-essential but has become essential for many people, and can be unique. (shrink)

Contrastivism is the claim that the knowledge relation is ternary, it relates three relata: a subject, a proposition, and a class of contrastive propositions. The present paper is a discussion of Jonathan Schaffer’s arguments in favour of contrastivism. The case is made that these are unconvincing: the traditional binary account of knowledge can handle the phenomena that ternarity is claimed to handle in a superior way.

It has recently been argued that the following Rule should be part of any characterization of science: Claims concerning specific disputed facts should be endorsed only if they are sufficiently supported by the application of validated methods of research or discovery, and moreover that acceptance of this Rule should lead one to reject religious belief. This paper argues, first, that the Rule, as stated, should not be accepted as it suffers from a number of problems. And second, that even if (...) the Rule were to be acceptable, it should not lead one to reject religious belief. (shrink)

De apostel Paulus spreekt in één van zijn brieven over ‘de verduistering van het verstand’ — een verduistering die het gevolg is van zonde.1 In het werk van een groot aantal filosofen uit de westerse filosofische traditie heeft dit woord van Paulus op een of andere wijze weerklank gevonden. Bij Augustinus, Anselmus, Thomas van Aquino, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, John Henry Newman en Franz von Baader bijvoorbeeld, en in ons land bij Abraham Kuyper en Herman Dooyeweerd, vindt men reflecties over de (...) noëtische gevolgen van de zonde.2 Deze denkers hebben de noëtische doorwerking van de zonde onder meer aangewezen in de volgende verschijnselen: dat mensen allerlei onware gedachten hebben dat onze kenvermogens lang niet altijd naar behoren functioneren, zoals onder andere blijkt uit geheugenzwakte, misperceptie en foutief redeneren dat mensen het vaak onderling oneens zijn. (shrink)

Ever since at least Aristotle, it has been widely recognized that a theory of responsibility must allow for the fact that in certain conditions agents are excused for not doing what they ought to do —and accordingly that they cannot be held responsible for what they did not, or did, do. In such conditions they are not appropriate candidates for one of what Strawson has called the "reactive attitudes" such as resentment, contempt, gratitude, and affection. Let us call such conditions (...) excusing conditions. The main aim of this paper is to show that the very same conditions that can excuse agents for not doing what they ought to do , also can excuse them for having false beliefs. As an afterthought it is suggested that this is a reason for thinking that humans can sometimes be held responsible for what they believe. (shrink)

Bundel filosofische voordrachten over de object-kenmerken van voorwerpen van esthetisch welgevallen.

Bijdragen over de actuele betekenis van de filosofie, met name de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte.

Is ChatGPT an author? Given its capacity to generate something that reads like human-written text in response to prompts, it might seem natural to ascribe authorship to ChatGPT. However, we argue that ChatGPT is not an author. ChatGPT fails to meet the criteria of authorship because it lacks the ability to perform illocutionary speech acts such as promising or asserting, lacks the fitting mental states like knowledge, belief, or intention, and cannot take responsibility for the texts it produces. Three perspectives (...) are compared: liberalism (which ascribes authorship to ChatGPT), conservatism (which denies ChatGPT's authorship for normative and metaphysical reasons), and moderatism (which treats ChatGPT as if it possesses authorship without committing to the existence of mental states like knowledge, belief, or intention). We conclude that conservatism provides a more nuanced understanding of authorship in AI than liberalism and moderatism, without denying the significant potential, influence, or utility of AI technologies such as ChatGPT. (shrink)

In this paper I first take a critical look at Grube’s allegiance to the idea that bivalence should be rejected as it can serve the cause of religious toleration. I argue that bivalence is not what Grube says it is, and that rejection of bivalence comes at a very high price that we should not be willing to pay. Next I analyze Grube’s argument for religious toleration – an argument that does not involve the rejection of bivalence. I argue that (...) the argument is unconvincing because there exists no relation between epistemic justification and toleration. (shrink)

Plurality of concepts of identity, foundational identity, and dualism This paper defends three claims. One: the Dutch word for ‘identity’ (viz. ‘identiteit’) is used to express very different concepts, such as the concept of ‘character’, ‘self-image’, ‘social identity’, ‘narrative identity’, and ‘identity through time’. Two: each of these concepts is applicable to human persons, but the concept of ‘identity through time’ is, in a crucial respect, more fundamental than the others. Three: because the fundamental concept of identity applies to human (...) persons, dualism is to be preferred over physicalism. (shrink)

Reading and textual interpretation are ordinary human activities, performed inside as well as outside academia, but precisely how they function as unique sources of knowledge is not well understood. In this book, René van Woudenberg explores the nature of reading and how it is distinct from perception and testimony, which are two widely acknowledged knowledge sources. After distinguishing seven accounts of interpretation, van Woudenberg discusses the question of whether all reading inevitably involves interpretation, and shows that although reading and interpretation (...) often go together, they are distinct activities. He goes on to argue that both reading and interpretation can be paths to realistically conceived truth, and explains the conditions under which we are justified in believing that they do indeed lead us to the truth. Along the way, he offers clear and novel analyses of reading, meaning, interpretation, and interpretative knowledge. (shrink)

This paper argues that next to the now widely recognized ‘externalist’ elements, Reid’s thought about belief with positive epistemic status contains a number of so-far unrecognized ‘internalist’ features. This claim is substantiated by (1) identifying a number of conditions that Reid holds beliefs of various sorts must satisfy if they are to have positive epistemic status, and by (2) arguing that, for Reid, many of these conditions are internal conditions. The conclusion is that the externalist and internalist elements in Reid (...) form a coherent whole and that his position can, with some qualification, be classified as the conjunction of weak externalism and weak internalism. (shrink)

According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (), modality‐specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property‐verification task in alternation. Responses on the property‐verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This (...) finding of a modality‐switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems. (shrink)